The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.

Nous introduisons une extension aux points fixes de la logique IF (faite pour l’indépendance) de Hintikka et Sandu. Nous donnons des résultats sur sa complexité et son pouvoir expressif. Nous la relions aux jeux de parité à information imparfaite, et nous montrons une application à la définition d’un mu-calcul modal fait pour l’indépendance.

ExcerptIn what follows, I would like to investigate the character of traditional Christian ritual, not as a full or comprehensive interpretation, but as a single step in that direction, inspired by recent archaeological excavations in southeastern Turkey and elsewhere that imply the primacy of ritual over material and economic factors in the development of society.1 The implications of these findings suggest that both anthropology and philosophy might focus on ritual as a key to the human. Yet if archaeological remains possess (...) the virtue of keys to the primordial, they also suffer from ineradicable obscurity that the absence of decipherable inscription…. (shrink)

I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...) the knower paradox provides strong support for the second. Whether verificationists want to go the route I've suggested is not for me todecide. As in the previous section my aim has been that of defending the mere viability of verificationism in the face of what many, many philosophers have taken to be its death-knell, namely Fitch's Proof. But, as the final objection makes clear, showing that verificationism can live in the face of Fitch's Proof is one thing; showing that it should live is another project. If nothing else, I hope that this papershows that verificationists still have a project to pursue; Fitch's Proof, contrary to popular opinion, need not bury verificationism.13. (shrink)

In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.

We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.

Hubert Dreyfus has recently invoked the work of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty in criticizing the ‘Myth of the Mental’. In criticizing that supposed myth, Dreyfus argues for a kind of foundationalism that takes embodied coping to be a self‐sufficient layer of human experience that supports our ‘higher’ mental activities. In turn, Merleau‐Ponty’s phenomenology is found, in Dreyfus’s recent writings, to corroborate this foundationalism. While Merleau‐Ponty would agree with many of Dreyfus’s points, this paper argues that he would not, in fact, agree with (...) the foundationalism. Furthermore, when understood in the right way, Merleau‐Ponty’s early phenomenology supports the idea, opposed to Dreyfus’s foundationalism, that conceptual activities are tied up with our coping activities. The paper ends by considering the upshot of this reading of Merleau‐Ponty’s work for Dreyfus’s phenomenology. (shrink)

The Book Discusses The Philosophical And Sociological Perspectives Of Education In The Context Of Indian Society. It Analysis And Interprets Various Educational Theories In The Light Of Needs Of 21St Century. The Book Suggests Practical Measures For Fulfilling The Objectives Of Secularism, Socialism And Democracy As Envisaged In The Constitution Of India. The Role Of Different Types Of Formal, Informal And Formal Agencies Of Education In This Regard Is Highlighted.

These lines of Cassandra's speech, as given in the MSS., run thus: νεν τ' παρχος λίου τ' ναστάτης οκ οδεν οα γλσσα μισητς κυνς λέξασα κα κτείνασα αιδρνους, δίκην της λαθραίου, τεξεται κακ τχ. τοιάδε τολμ· θλυς ρσενος ονες στιν.

Book reviewed in this article:Developing a taste for Phillips' provocative writings; A review of: D.C. Phillips.Regressive turtles versus research; A review of: MacPherson.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Originally, Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition ignored Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, on the basis that Hegel’s post-Jena writings moved from intersubjectivism to idealism. More recently, however, Honneth has reconsidered the elements of the Phenomenology that consider recognition. Around the same time that he began re-evaluating Hegel’s discussions of recognition, Honneth developed a theory of “elementary recognition” that is a basic level of affective engagement with one’s environment that must be in place before one can take up cognitive relations to others. (...) On its face, Honneth’s study of Hegel’s Phenomenology and his discussion of elementary recognition would seem to be largely unrelated. But as this paper will show, the two works discuss very similar ideas and complement each other quite well. Furthermore, the expansion of some ideas developed in Honneth’s study of the Phenomenology can help respond to criticisms that have been leveled against his theory of elementary recognition. (shrink)